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Abstract 
President Bush, the World Health Organization, and 
leading scholars have called for greater price 
transparency in health care. Posting historic prices 
informs consumers of expected costs and shames providers 
that charge high prices to vulnerable populations. There 
is some danger, however, that price transparency would 
increase prices paid by the poor, delay or deter business 
entry in poor markets, reduce competition, lower 
investment, and be misleading if inaccurately measured by 
a third party. We recommend alternative approaches to 
lowering prices for the poor and enhancing efficiency. 
Key Words: transparency, differential pricing, hospitals, 
pharmaceuticals   3 
Calls for Price Transparency  
Price transparency, i.e. low-cost access to 
information about what others pay, is a treatment 
prescribed for multiple health care “ailments,” including 
inefficiency and inequity. Some believe price 
transparency will increase static efficiency by promoting 
price competition.
1 Others believe price transparency 
will increase equity by reducing prices and enhancing 
access for the poor.
2  
The World Health Organization (WHO) and Health 
Action International (HAI) recommend price transparency 
for decreasing prices and increasing access to 
pharmaceuticals for the poor in their 2006 report “Price, 
availability, and affordability: An international 
comparison of chronic disease medicines.” A 2001 
resolution from the World Health Assembly created a 
mandate for extensive international drug price surveys. 
In 2006 President Bush signed an executive order 
requiring that hospitals and physicians disclose price 
and quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries, 
federal employees, the military and veterans.
3 At the 
same time, the chief executive of the largest U.S. 
hospital chain pledged that HCA hospitals would make 
price transparency a top priority.
4    4 
Michael Porter and Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg 
advocate price transparency and uniformity in their 2006 
book “Redefining Health Care.” Their proposals would lead 
to price uniformity both indirectly through transparency 
and directly through extending a Maryland law requiring 
that providers not price differentiate between their 
patients. 
Price transparency is prescribed in some cases to 
increase efficiency and in other cases to increase 
fairness, but it can have harmful side effects. Price 
transparency can increase prices paid by vulnerable 
people, delay or deter launch of products in poor 
markets, reduce competition, lower investment spending, 
and be misleading if inaccurately measured by a third 
party. We describe the conditions under which 
transparency might be welfare-increasing or decreasing, 
and suggest which outcome is likely in various health 
markets. We conclude by recommending alternative 
policies. 
Effects of Price Transparency 
First, price transparency can reduce buyers’ search 
costs. Similarly, price transparency can provide 
yardstick competition to identify whether procurement 
personnel are obtaining low prices.
5   5 
Second, price transparency can make buyers and 
sellers tougher negotiators. Buyers would have new 
information, and sellers would have additional incentives 
to avoid price concessions for one buyer that could cut 
the price for all buyers.
6 
Third, informational spill-overs from transparent 
pricing might facilitate collusion among sellers and 
raise prices.
7 Price cartels are easier to enforce when 
prices are transparent, because transparency removes the 
possibility of secret discounts.
8 
9 
Fourth, price transparency might make prices more 
uniform. Many scholars have analyzed the welfare 




12 For simplicity, 
consider the effects on three groups. First, buyers for 
whom uniform prices are lower than those under price 
discrimination are clearly better off. Second, buyers for 
whom uniform prices are higher than those under price 
discrimination are clearly harmed. Third, sellers’ 
profits fall under most circumstances, because if uniform 
pricing increased profits, presumably sellers would have 
already chosen to set uniform prices. To mitigate price 
compression, firms might elect not to sell to buyers in 
low price markets or might find alternative ways of 
making prices less transparent.   6 
Fifth, price transparency and compression could harm 
incentives for research and development. The discussion 
thus far has focused on the short-run consequences of 
uniform prices. In the pharmaceutical industry, however, 
long run effects on research R&D should also be 
addressed. If uniform pricing reduces firms’ profits it 
reduces their incentives to invest in risky R&D 
projects.
13 At the margin, some projects whose social 
benefits justify the costs of development will not be 
undertaken.
14  
Price transparency is prescribed for multiple 
“ailments” of the health care system, including 
inefficiency and inequity, but it can have the harmful 
side effects described above. Next we examine the 
different “patients” for which price transparency is 
prescribed, beginning with pharmaceuticals and then 
turning to hospitals. 
Pharmaceutical Price Transparency 
The World Health Organization and Health Action 
International advocate pharmaceutical price transparency. 
A 2001 resolution from the World Health Assembly created 
a mandate for extensive international drug price surveys. 
These surveys are, however, flawed according to Ridley 
(2005). The WHO/HAI price measurement i) has insufficient   7 
adjustments for drug quality variations, ii) uses price 
ratios rather than price levels, iii) artificially 
measures countries’ wealth (e.g., using a country’s 
lowest-paid unskilled government worker), iv) disregards 
patents, v) is too slow in adjusting to changes in 
prices, inflation, and exchange rates, and vi) requires 
difficult-to-obtain procurement prices.
15 If the 
measurement issues could be resolved, would 
pharmaceutical price transparency be socially beneficial? 
We examine this below. 
WHO/HAI argues that price transparency would 
simplify procurement. Under price transparency, the price 
charged to other buyers could be a substitute for a 
competing bid from a different supplier. The additional 
information provided by transparent pricing could reveal 
cases of egregious mismanagement or corruption by 
government officials or excessive mark-ups by middlemen 
or retailers. Thus, the WHO/HAI proposal for price 
transparency might introduce yardstick competition. 
Actually, there is little uncertainty about the true 
cost of most drugs. With a few exceptions (such as 
biologics), marginal costs are low. True, there might be 
uncertainty as to exactly how low marginal costs are, and 
extremely poor countries might benefit from knowing that 
the true marginal cost is lower by one penny. However,   8 
price transparency would likely be more beneficial to 
governments in rich countries. Many wealthy countries 
already use international reference pricing, and mandate 
that the price cannot exceed the average or minimum price 
in a basket of other countries. WHO/HAI seems aware of 
the usefulness of price comparisons in middle and high-
income countries, writing "The methodology has been 
designed primarily for use in low- and middle-income 
countries, but should be applicable to all countries...”
16 
Easier international price comparisons could lead to 
more price uniformity across countries. This might result 
from international reference pricing, parallel trade, or 
a desire by firms to avoid the appearance of “unfair” 
price discrimination.
17 
18 As mentioned in the previous 
section, the welfare effects of increased price 
uniformity are generally ambiguous. Here, we consider 
which factors would apply in the market for 
pharmaceuticals. 
Developing countries that are paying more than rich 
countries benefit if price transparency leads to a 
uniform price below what they are currently paying. 
Obviously, the converse is also true: countries that are 
paying relatively low prices for drugs would be harmed if 
the uniform price were higher. The WHO/HAI report noted 
many instances in which prices in developing countries   9 
were above the median international price, but there were 
also many other medicines that were relatively 
inexpensive (below the median international price) in 
developing countries. It is worth repeating that profit-
maximizing pharmaceutical firms would be more likely to 
set low prices in developing countries and high prices in 
developed countries. A uniform price would likely be 
between the firm’s preferred price in developed countries 
and that in developing countries, thus reducing welfare 
for developing countries. Furthermore, pharmaceutical 
companies tend to avoid markets with relatively low 




21 In other words, some low-priced markets 
are simply not served, and greater price transparency 
might result in even fewer product launches in low-priced 
countries. 
Clearly, pharmaceutical profits fall as a result of 
price transparency. Understandably, the WHO/HAI is more 
concerned with the welfare of developing countries than 
the short-run profits of drug firms. However, in the long 
run, investment in R&D will probably fall if 
pharmaceutical firms expect lower profits. Estimates vary 





25 However, any decrease in innovative 
output would have negative welfare consequences for both   10 
developing and developed countries, and these 
consequences should be weighed against the benefits of 
increased short-run affordability.  
Another concern is that pharmaceutical firms might 
direct their R&D toward rich-country diseases. Products 
that are not essential for life are easier to price high 
and keep out of developing country markets that could 
undermine the rich-country price. For example, 
pharmaceutical companies might focus on treatments for 
conditions such as wrinkled skin, acne, erectile 
dysfunction, and attention deficit disorder. To some 
extent, pharmaceutical firms already focus R&D efforts on 
rich countries.
26 
27 However, an increase in price 
uniformity might only tilt the focus even more towards 
rich markets. 
We noted in passing that firms might respond to a 
policy of transparency by making direct price comparisons 
more difficult. In response to U.S. Medicaid procurement 
policies, which require firms to sell their drugs to 
Medicaid at the lowest price they sell to any private 
insurer, firms introduced additional versions of their 
products, with certain versions intended for the Medicaid 
market, and slightly different versions for private 
buyers.
28 Similarly, there is evidence that pharmaceutical 
firms adjusted their product portfolios in the European   11 
Union to make parallel trade of identical products 
between high and low price countries more difficult.
29 
Some drug firms already produce different versions of 
their products for developing markets, largely to 
identify gray market trade (illegal shipments from 
developing countries to markets with higher prices). They 
might find it profitable to differentiate further: for 
example, they might market only basic versions of their 
products in developing countries, while selling extended-
release versions in rich countries. 
Thus, even if international price comparisons could 
be accurately made by third parties, the social 
consequences are ambiguous.  
Hospital Price Transparency 
Historically, there has been little patient demand 
for hospital price information, because most patients 
have insurance and because in an emergency it is not 
practical to get multiple price quotations. Likewise, 
there was little supply of price information; most 
hospitals were unable or unwilling to quote prices.
30 The 
demand for price information is increasing, though, as 
more consumers opt for high-deductible insurance coverage 
or choose elective surgery not covered by insurance.
31    12 
In 2006 HCA, the largest U.S. hospital chain 
initiated a trial at its north Texas hospitals. Patients 
were offered estimated prices prior to care. While common 
practice in other markets, estimating individual prices 
in advance was novel in the U.S. hospital market. In 2007 
HCA planned to extend the practice to most of its U.S. 
hospitals.
32 Exhibit 1 lists prices for uninsured patients 
using select services posted on the web by HCA hospitals 
in north Texas in March 2007. HCA describes these as 
“managed care-like” prices. Insured people, who might 
care about prices because of deductibles or coinsurance, 
can call HCA for price quotes. Uninsured people with 
income less than 200 percent of the Federal poverty level 
receive free emergency care. 
Hospitals, like other firms with market power, 
prefer to charge lower prices to poor or uninsured 
patients, who have high demand elasticity. For example, 
China’s TEDA International Cardiovascular Hospital 
charges US$6.70 per night for poor patients or US$3200 
per night for rich patients receiving identical care, 
though different quality rooms.
33 Likewise, India’s 
Narayan Hrudayalaya charges US$2400 for a regular package 
involving open heart surgery or up to US$4300 for a 
package with private rooms but identical care.
34   13 
Unfortunately, many U.S. hospitals have been 
charging higher prices to poor uninsured patients than to 
rich insured patients
 35 for three reasons. First, poor 
uninsured patients do not have the negotiating power of 
insurers. Second, higher charges for uncompensated care 
make the hospital appear more charitable (important for 
justifying the hospital's non-profit status) and increase 
its Medicare outlier or private insurance stop-loss 
payments. Tenet appears to have been especially 
aggressive with its charges; its outlier payments 
increased from $351 million in 2000 to $763 million in 
2002.
36 Third, hospital administrators believed that they 
had to charge high prices to the poor so as not to 
undermine Medicare and private insurance prices.  
Price transparency exposes hospitals that charge 
higher prices to certain populations. This might benefit 
the uninsured poor. Transparency might also make insurers 
better negotiators by enabling them to compare the price 
they pay to the price their rivals pay. On the other 
hand, transparency might make hospitals tougher 
negotiators, because they could credibly decline to give 
an insurer a discount on the grounds that the hospital 
would face pressure from other insurers for the same 
discount. Finally, most hospital markets have few 
competitors, and in oligopoly markets such as these,   14 
transparent prices can facilitate collusion. Transparent 
prices make it easier for oligopolies to set a collusive 
price and easier to maintain the collusive price, because 
they cannot secretly deviate from it.
37 
If price transparency reduces profits it could force 
hospitals to close or discontinue unprofitable services. 
In many industries, it is desirable for less efficient 
firms to close, but in the case of hospitals the least 
profitable are those serving inner cities and those 
providing services such as burn units, neonatal intensive 
care units, and AIDS clinics. Altman and colleagues 
(2006) argue that price transparency would have severe 
consequences unless payers increase reimbursement for 
under-funded services.
38 
We have argued that price transparency can 
indirectly lead to price uniformity. Some have argued for 
direct mechanisms for price uniformity. The state of 
Maryland requires that providers charge the same price to 
every patient, regardless of insurance status. Porter and 
Teisberg (2006) recommend that federal regulations ban 
differential pricing by providers or at least require 
that “charges by a given provider for the same services 
would not vary more than the allowed band.”
39    15 
Price uniformity would correct the problem of poor 
buyers paying more than rich buyers. A disadvantage of 
price uniformity, however, is that it would become 
illegal to charge lower prices to poor people. Surely 
hospitals should be permitted to give discounts to low-
income people. Currently, hospitals negotiate with poor 
people to pay a fraction of their total charge. This 
benefits hospitals. Hospitals have high fixed costs of 
technology, but the marginal costs are often lower, so 
use of some technology could be offered to the poor at a 
low price. 
Calls for price uniformity are motivated in part by 
the prevalence of higher hospital prices for the poor 
than for the rich in the U.S. It seems, however, that 
some of the problem will be solved by regulatory reform. 
In 2004 Mike Leavitt, the U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, told the American Hospital Association 
that Medicare rules do not prohibit discounts for poor 
people.
40 Now some hospitals offer means-tested discounts 
for uninsured patients bringing the prices they pay 
closer to or less than prices paid by commercial 
insurers.
41 
42 If hospitals continue to move toward lower 
prices for the poor, then uniform prices could raise 
prices for the uninsured poor. In the next sections, we   16 
make policy recommendations for pharmaceuticals and 
hospitals. 
Recommendations for Pharmaceuticals 
First, rich and poor governments alike should commit 
to reduce gray market trade and international reference 
pricing.
43 Facilitating differential pricing will probably 
help developing countries and pharmaceutical firms, 
though richer countries would have to accept higher drug 
prices. For example, the U.S. government accepted that it 
would be charged higher prices than low-income people in 
the U.S. Drug manufacturers are required to give Medicaid 
their best price (OBRA 1990) but in order to facilitate 
drug discount cards for the poor, the administrator for 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services informed 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in 2002 that their discount 
cards would not count against Medicaid best price. 
Without relaxing the law, several manufacturers indicated 
that they would not have offered low prices to the poor.
44  
Second, the WHO and other international 
organizations should continue to examine the bottlenecks 
to supply within developing countries.
45 It is in the 
interests of drug manufacturers and advocates for the 
poor to improve drug supply chains. These alternatives to   17 
transparent pricing would likely be more effective in 
achieving the fundamental aims of the WHO/HAI. 
Recommendations for Hospitals 
First, the U.S. government and private insurers 
should change reimbursement mechanisms that reward 
hospitals for inflating charges for the poor. While 
hospitals no longer interpret the rules as requiring them 
to charge high prices to the poor, hospitals can still 
inflate their apparent generosity by charging high prices 
for people who do not pay. Uncompensated care should be 
valued at Medicare prices rather than at hospitals’ list 
prices.  
Second, hospitals should promise low prices to the 
poor who hold hospital discount cards. Charging lower 
prices to them can be permissible, ethical, and 
profitable, so we should expect it. The program could be 
modelled on the discount cards introduced by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
Third, other hospitals should join HCA in providing 
patients with price quotes in advance. This is more 
useful for hospitals and patients than relying on third 
parties to post historic prices paid by others.   18 
Conclusions 
Price transparency and uniformity might seem fair 
and desirable, especially to those that are uninformed 
and/or pay higher prices. Transparency and uniformity 
might, however, raise prices for the poor and decrease 
providers’ incentives to enter poor markets. For example 
pharmaceutical manufacturers might delay sales to a poor 
country and might shift R&D focus even further toward 
rich-world diseases. Hospitals might eliminate less 
lucrative services for the poor, including closing 
hospitals in poor neighborhoods. Wilensky (2006) suggests 
that ending differential pricing would hurt poor people 
in pharmaceutical markets and have uncertain affects on 
poor people in hospital markets.
46 Additional research would 
be valuable in measuring the net effect of price transparency. 
Providers and manufacturers should be prepared to 
quote advanced prices for patients. Pharmaceutical 
companies and a few U.S. hospitals already do. In these 
cases, governments and non-governmental organizations 
should not require that a seller's price to one buyer be 
uniform or transparent to all buyers, because it can 
undermine differential pricing (and be inaccurate). 
Indeed, it might be more beneficial for governments to 
promote opaque and differential pricing in the interest 
of helping the poor and promoting innovation. Providers   19 
should also endeavor to help the poor (and often help 
their own profits) by identifying low-income patients and 
charging them lower prices.   20 
EXHIBIT 1 
HCA posts estimated prices for its uninsured patients on 
the Internet. This is common practice in other 
industries, but rare for hospitals in 2007. 

































































CAT Scan  $1,039 -  $1,098 -  $1,224 -   21 








Uninsured patients with income less than 200 percent of 
the Federal poverty level receive free emergency care. 
Source: HCA North Texas Patient Pricing and Financial 
Information March 2007 (http://www.lonestarhealth.com/)   22 
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